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X-FROM-URL:https://eom.sdu.dk/events/ical/4d11de58-773c-45f8-89b5-a1d34d0c
 d8ce
X-WR-CALNAME:Pieter Vanhuysse: Do European Societies Tax Their Own Reprodu
 ction?
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TZID:Europe/Copenhagen
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Copenhagen
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DTSTAMP:20260505T140831Z
DTSTART:20261028T030000
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DESCRIPTION:[b]DIAS Lecture [/b] [nl] [nl]\n\n[b] Abstract[/b] [nl]\nWhat 
 are the intergenerational resource transfer burdens over the working life
  of parents compared to non-parents in Europe? We use National Transfer a
 nd National Time Transfer Accounts to comprehensively estimate these burd
 ens for twelve European Union member states around 2010. Going beyond pub
 lic transfers\, we also value two statistically less visible transfer typ
 es in the family realm: of market goods (money) and of unpaid household l
 abor (time). The transfer packages of parents and non-parents differ radi
 cally. Non-parents contribute almost exclusively to public transfers. But
  parents\, and only parents\, additionally provide still larger familial 
 transfers: mothers mainly time\, fathers mainly money. Estimating resourc
 e transfer stocks over the working life\, we find that the average parent
 al/non-parental contribution ratio flips from 0.73 (public transfers alon
 e) to 2.66 (all three transfers together). The implicit tax rates de fact
 o imposed thereby on rearing children are multiples of the value-added ta
 x rates in place on consumption goods. Especially in view of low rates of
  fertility and rising rates of intentional childlessness on an aging cont
 inent\, the magnitude of these asymmetric transfer burdens carries multip
 le implications for sociological and policy debates. For instance\, it ra
 ises the question whether European societies stealthily tax their own rep
 roduction too heavily [nl] [nl] \n\n[b]About Pieter Vanhuysse[/b] [nl]\nP
 hD (LSE) Professor Pieter Vanhuysse is a Full Professor at the Department
  of Political Science and Public Management and the Danish Centre for Wel
 fare Studies (DaWS) at SDU. [nl]\n\nHe is also founding Board Member of t
 he Interdisciplinary Centre on Population Dynamics at the Faculty of Busi
 ness and Social Sciences (CPOP-SAMF). He holds degrees from the Universit
 y of Leuven (MA in economics\; Certificate in philosophy) and the London 
 School of Economics (MSc and PhD in government). Prior to joining SDU\, h
 e was Deputy Director and Director of Research at the European Centre for
  Social Welfare Policy and Research\, a United Nations-affiliated thinkta
 nk in Vienna. [nl] [nl]\n\n[i]This lecture takes place at DIAS seminaroom
  [/i] [nl] [nl]
DTEND:20220622T101500Z
DTSTAMP:20260505T140831Z
DTSTART:20220622T091500Z
LOCATION:Syddansk Universitet\, Campusvej 55\, 5230\, Odense M
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Pieter Vanhuysse: Do European Societies Tax Their Own Reproduction?
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